The underdetermination of theory by data obtains when, inescapably, evidence is insufficient to allow scientists to decide responsibly between rival theories. One response to would-be underdetermination is to deny that the rival theories are distinct theories at all, insisting instead that they are just different formulations of the same underlying theory; we call this the identical rivals response. An argument adapted from John Norton suggests that the response is presumptively always appropriate, while another from Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin suggests that the response is never appropriate. Arguments from Einstein for the special and general theories of relativity may fruitfully be seen as instances of the identical rivals response; since Einstein's arguments are generally accepted, the response is at least sometimes appropriate. But when is it appropriate?
We attempt to steer a middle course between Norton's view and that of Laudan and Leplin: the identical rivals response is appropriate when there is good reason for adopting a parsimonious ontology. Although in simple cases the identical rivals response need not involve any ontological difference between the theories, in actual scientific cases it typically requires treating apparent posits of the various theories as mere verbal ornaments or computational conveniences. Since these would-be posits are not now detectable, there is no perfectly reliable way to decide whether we should eliminate them or not. As such, there is no rule for deciding whether the identical rivals response is appropriate or not. Nevertheless, there are considerations that suggest for and against the response; we conclude by suggesting two of them.
Responding to underdetermination
Consider a prima facie case of underdetermination: There seem to be two theories T 1 and T 2 such that standards of responsible theory choice preclude deciding between them. If we accept that the case is as it seems, then we must decide what to do about T 1 and T 2 . A modest agnostic response is to suspend judgment. If our actions depend on the difference between them, then we muddle along in our uncertainty. A more bumptious response-call this fideism-is to believe one of the two theories anyway, as an article of faith.
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Of course, since this is only an apparent case of underdetermination, we might instead try to show that the choice is not really underdetermined at all. There are again two possibilities. We might deny that responsible choice between the two is impossible. If we tinker with the standards of theory choice, then there might be grounds to prefer one or the other. This is a standard gambit of realists, who add simplicity, novel prediction, or explanatory power to the 1 Regarding fideism, see Magnus (2005a) and also van Fraasen (2002) . standards that guide theory choice. To highlight the contrast with agnosticism, call this the gnostic response.
Alternately, we might deny that there really are two rival theories under consideration. This might seem as bumptious a response as fideism, but it need not be. Imagine, for example, that T 1 is a theory in French and that T 2 is its German translation; that T 1 is a theory expressed in the metric system and that the only difference in T 2 is that values are converted to imperial units; or that T 1 is formulated using Cartesian coördinates and that T 2 expresses equivalent claims using polar coördinates. Surely, standards of responsible theory choice will be insufficient to prefer one over the other with any of these three pairs.
Within each pair, both of the options are the selfsame theory! One merits belief just if the other does. There really is no underdetermination at all. We might reply to any apparent case of underdetermination by insisting that the alleged rivals are really just different formulations of the same theory. Call this the identical rivals response.
These four responses form a matrix; see figure 1. 2 2 Sklar (1974, ch 2) and Gardner (1976) 
Two examples from Einstein
Einstein employs what is recognizably the identical rivals response in formulating both the special and general theories of relativity. The same inferential pattern appears in his 1905 special relativity paper and reappears, applied to different subject matter, in his justification of the principle of equivalence, one of the essential steps on the intellectual road to general relativity. Einstein (1905 Einstein ( /1952 claims that Maxwell's electrodynamics suffers from certain faults. He presents these faults via the now-famous example of a magnet and a conductor moving relative to one another. If the magnet is regarded as moving and the conductor as being at rest, Maxwell's theory claims that an electric field with a certain energy will come into existence around the magnet, which produces an observable current in parts of the conductor. However, if the magnet is regarded as being at rest and the conductor as moving, then there is no electric field in the neighborhood of the magnet. Instead, an electromotive force is created in the conductor. This electromotive force gives rise to the very same current in the conductor as in the first case. If we move with the magnet, we say that an electrical field is produced around the magnet;
if we move with the conductor, we say an electromotive force is produced in the conductor. In both cases, however, the current running though the conductor is the same; if we connected an ammeter to the conductor, we would measure the same value for the current in both cases. Einstein draws the following moral from these two cases:
"Maxwell's electrodynamics... when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries which do not appear in the phenomena" (1905/1952, 37) .
Let T 1 be the description according to which the magnet is in motion and the conductor is at rest; let T 2 be the description according to which the conductor is in motion and the magnet is at rest. T 1 and T 2 make the same predictions for all observable phenomena. We have a prima facie case of underdetermination.
In a similar case, Galileo counseled an agnostic response. In his famous discussion of a moving boat, Galileo concludes that the people below decks cannot tell whether they are in motion or not-it is 'as if' the people are at rest (1967, 116) . Given two bodies in relative motion, Galileo would have said, there is a fact of the matter about whether one of them is at rest or not-even though no local appearances could allow us to determine which of the two is moving. In this case there is a genuine agnostic response to putative underdetermination; it is not merely a conceptual possibility marked out in figure 1. Einstein considers two frames of reference. The first frame is inertial, i.e. it has zero acceleration in all three spatial dimensions, but has a homogeneous gravitational field of strength g directed along the 3 Einstein expresses this idea in print. He writes that "previous mechanics had indeed registered this important law, but had not interpreted it". An acceptable "interpretation" of this identity requires recognizing that one and "the same quality of a body expresses itself, according to circumstances, as 'inertia' or as 'weight' " (Einstein 1917 (Einstein /1997 . And elsewhere: "It is...clear that science is fully justified in assigning such a numerical equality only after this numerical equality is reduced to an equality of the real nature of the two concepts" (1922/2002, 56-7) .
y-axis in the negative direction. 4 The second frame is non-inertial, for it accelerates in the y-direction at the rate γ, but has zero acceleration along the other axes. The equations of motion for an observer at rest with respect to the second frame "are the same equations that describe motion in the [homogenous] gravitational field. We can thus say: [the second frame of reference] is at rest, but a gravitational field is present.
We need only set g=-γ. Through this conception, the essential difference between inertial and heavy mass is taken away" (1919, I.6).
How should one interpret the physical meaning of the equality g=- in a gravitation-free region, then the spring experiences inertial resistance; while if the system is considered to be at rest in a uniform gravitational field, then the spring experiences weight due to gravity. In both cases, a spring-based scale would measure the same force. Given the meter reading for the spring, we can explain this reading by positing an inertial force acting on it (the scale is accelerating in a gravitation-free region), or a gravitational force acting on it (the scale is at rest in a uniform gravitational field). One could accept this underdetermination at face value and respond with agnosticism, holding that one or the other description is correct even though we limited beings cannot say which. Einstein does not respond in this way.
Rather, he concludes that the two forces are in fact 'essentially' the same, so that there is no real difference between an accelerated spring in a space free of gravitational forces and a spring at rest in a homogeneous gravitational field.
The difference between Einstein's two cases stems from the difference between the special theory, which maintains the notion of a privileged set of inertial frameworks, and the general theory, which attempts to do without such structures. The constant velocity of the 1905 paper is replaced by constant acceleration later. But both of these arguments pose would-be underdetermination scenarios between two descriptions, but defuse the underdetermination by way of the identical rivals response.
Ontology and the examples
The previous section illustrated two instances of the identical rivals response. They are sufficient to show that the identical rivals response is at least sometimes, if not always, appropriate-at least for philosophers of science who consider Einstein's arguments to be good.
Nevertheless, both go beyond the identical rivals response as we originally posed it. The trivial case was when we imagined the same theory in French and in German (or in metric and imperial units of measure, or in Cartesian and polar coördinates)-suppose, for the sake of concreteness, that we have contemporary biochemistry in two languages. The theories talk about a great many unobservable things, like amino acids, enzymes, and so on, as well as their many properties and relations. When we make the identical rivals response, we accept each of the theories. We accept that there really are amino acids and whatnot. For present purposes, it does not matter if this is the practical acceptance of a constructive empiricist or the belief of a realist. What matters is that the two theories are understood as positing a rich ontology of unobservable stuff. We accept the ontologies of the two theories at face value, and-as part of the identical rivals responsewe insist that the two ontologies are the same.
The two non-trivial examples are importantly different than this. In the next section, we attempt to deliver on this claim.
General arguments
Our approach in this section begins with a sort of antinomy: An argument by John Norton purports to show that (to put it in our 5 One might say that they are false, or that they lack truth-values because of presupposition failure or some other semantic problems. But false and truth-valueless theories are both unacceptable, so this difference is unimportant here.
terminology) the identical rivals response is presumptively appropriate whenever we seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories. At the other extreme, an argument by Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin purports to show that there could never be empirically equivalent theories. A consequence of the latter argument is that whenever we seem to be faced with empirically equivalent theories we must be mistaken; as such, the identical rivals response would never be appropriate. So these arguments seem to reach incompatible conclusions. This antinomy is resolved by explicitly acknowledging the rôle of ontological parsimony in applications of the identical rivals response. Before arguing for this, we should explain the two arguments.
THESIS: Anytime we are faced with apparent underdetermination, the identical rivals response is probably appropriate. To give the argument for the thesis briefly:
Suppose we have two theories which are demonstrated to have the same observational consequences.
Since the observational consequences can be reasoned about in this way, there must be some tractable description of them. If the observational consequences of a theory can be described compactly without recourse to the non-observable posits of the theory, then the posits are otiose. So we may presume this not to be possible. There are descriptions of the observational consequences of each theory that make essential use of the central theoretical terms of that theory.
There are three possibilities: Either the theoretical structures of the two theories are utterly distinct, one theory has surplus structure, or they are interconvertible without loss. Norton's formulation of the argument is somewhat weaker than what we have in mind. It "is specifically restricted to those [theories] whose observational equivalence can be demonstrated in the sort of compact argumentation that can appear in a paper in the philosophy of science literature" (2008, 33) . And there may be be a gap between a case being a "very strong candidate" for the identical rivals response (as Norton says) and the response's being probably appropriate.
Regardless, the same argument form can be re-deployed to yield the conclusion that the identical rivals response should be the presumptive reaction to empirically equivalent theories, and we will refer to this as 'Norton's argument' below.
Norton's argument raises several issues, but we wish to concentrate on his answer to the second possibility: one of the theories has surplus structure that is not essential for producing the theory's observational consequences. Toy examples of this kind are easy to produce. Let one theory be standard particle physics, and let another theory be standard particle physics plus the posit that there is an undetectable dragon in my garage. Of course the observational consequences of these two theories are the same, and one cannot argue on the basis of observation that there is no dragon. Yet it is tempting to treat the dragon not as an actual posit of the second theory, treating it instead as "superfluous"
and "unphysical."
However, refusing to treat dragons as a serious posit of the second theory is not entirely innocent. Imagine that a century from now there is a technique for detecting previously undetectable dragons. Future scientists might come to the place where my garage once stood, turn on their dragonometers, and decide between these two theories. The invisible dragon would not be superfluous or unphysical after all.
Returning to the more realistic cases of relativistic physics, it could turn out that future scientific generations will find good reasons to posit absolute velocities or to distinguish inertial effects from gravitational underdetermined even though the theories would not be empirically equivalent. For another such case, see Magnus (2005b) .
Returning to Norton's argument, his answer to the second possibility is crucial. Ontological parsimony-refusing to take the excess structure as physical-rules out the possibility that the excess part will generate detectable differences as science advances. It is important to note that this eliminativist move is typically a crucial part of deploying the identical rivals response. We treat undetectable dragons as superfluous because the rest of science directs us to dismiss squamous phantoms. Yet we are fallibilists, and we recognize that we might be wrong; so we cannot banish dragons completely-dragons and absolute velocities remain (in a weak sense) epistemically possible.
If scientists in a century develop dragonometers or übergyroscopes, our parsimonious ontology and identical rivals response will prove wrong in retrospect. Norton's argument only yields the conclusion that surplus structures are 'candidates' for occamizing; any two theories with the same observational consequences are candidates for the identical rivals response. Whether the identical rivals response should be elevated from mere candidacy to full adoption depends crucially on whether there is good evidence for ontological parsimony.
Here is another way of making the same basic point. Parties on both sides of the antinomy can accept the conditional 'If two theories are truly empirically equivalent, then they are identical simpliciter.' The thesis (Norton's conclusion) follows from accepting the antecedent and, by modus ponens, deriving identity. The antithesis (Laudan and Leplin's conclusion) follows from rejecting the consequent and, by modus tollens, deriving their empirical inequivalence. We have attempted to show in this section that both modus ponens and modus tollens, as uniform policies, would be rash when facing apparent cases of underdetermination. The success of Einstein's gambits shows that Laudan and Leplin's modus tollens view is too strong, while Laudan and Leplin's plausible point concerning the variability of auxiliary hypotheses, and resultant variability of what is observable, shows that modus ponens would be too strong. An important reason why uniform modus ponens and uniform modus tollens are both too extreme is that the identical rivals response typically involves (in realistic cases) ontological eliminativism, and there is simply no rule to always eliminate or never eliminate-or even a default rule to eliminate or not.
As philosophers should be well aware from debates over several specific eliminativist proposals, the evidential situation pro or contra elimination is usually rather subtle and complex.
Two conditions, but no rule
The discussion so far shows that the identical rivals response is sometimes appropriate but cannot necessarily be applied to all cases of apparent underdetermination. Applying it is not simply a matter of inspecting the meanings of the would-be rival theories. It is usually a matter of deciding how to understand them: treat the differences as substantive physical disagreement, or treat the differences as merely verbal. We strongly suspect that there is no determinate algorithm for this decision. We can never with absolute certainty rule out the possibility that future auxiliary theories might change the observable consequences of the theories, making today's superfluous content into tomorrow's well-confirmed posit. The point here is not just that such an outcome is logically possible. The Laudan-Leplin worries can always be formulated so long as the two rival theories are treated as genuinely distinct. As such, whether the would-be rivals are merely variant formulations of the same theory cannot be known with certainty. Despite the reasonable doubts raised by the Laudan-Leplin arguments, the two examples from Einstein are sufficient to show that the identical rivals response is sometimes appropriate.
Even though there is no algorithm, we want to suggest two kinds of considerations that are relevant to this decision.
The future discriminability condition
The identical rivals response is ultimately untenable if future developments will allow for scientists to observationally distinguish between the rival theories. If future technology can detect absolute motion, then it is a mistake even now to treat the disagreements about absolute motion as merely verbal differences. Conversely, the identical rivals response is tenable if such future developments will not occur.
Call this the future discriminability condition, because it is not directly available to deliberation in the present moment. It is always a matter of whether future possibilities will be realized or not.
However, there can be directly available evidence for or against the future development of observable differences. Before the first neutrino detectors, it would have been rash to trim them presumptively from our ontology; scientists reasonably expected that it would eventually be possible to detect neutrinos, as technology advanced. In cases like these, it is inappropriate to apply the identical rivals response. 10 Such 10 This position does not beg the question of realism against the constructive empiricist. By ruling out the identical rivals response in such cases, we are only insisting that the theories should be understood to actually posit ultrasonic vibrations and neutrinos. The realist and the cases contrast with e.g. absolute velocity, whose inaccessibility to our senses has nothing to do with its being too small for our visual system to detect. No matter how powerful our microscopes become, detecting absolute velocity will not become any easier. It would require an instrument that works in utterly novel ways, instead of simply extending our already-existing discriminatory powers. So the identical rivals response is more defensible here than in the case of neutrinos.
The heuristic utility condition
Independently, surplus structure may serve a useful heuristic rôle. Conversely, the response is appropriate when the posits serve no useful heuristic role.
A posit might be heuristically useful in this way even if it never makes an observable difference. Even if a particle theory is revised before techniques to observe the particle are developed, taking the posit seriously could be crucial for developing the theory; descendants of the theory may be ultimately confirmed.
constructive empiricist agree on that much, and we leave them to argue over whether we should believe in the posits or merely accept as empirically adequate the theory that posits them.
In the remainder of the section, we consider two examples in which the internal condition plays a prominent rôle: quantum mechanics in 1926 and the indeterminacy of translation.
In In this case, as with the other cases we have considered, the identical rivals response involved ontological streamlining.
Schrödinger's version of quantum mechanics described unobserved particles as fluctuating bits of jiggly matter; in Muller's phrase, "tiny jelly-like lumps of vibrating charged matter" (1997, 229) . Treating wave mechanics as equivalent to the antimetaphyscial matrix mechanics meant treating these waves as unphysical.
Consider a different example: Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is a reaction to a putative underdetermination scenario. This putative case of underdetermination might be met in any of the four general ways that we discussed in the introduction. If we took the agnostic route, we would infer that the existence of the two translation manuals shows that we English speakers cannot know which translation of a given utterance in Jungle provides the true meaning of that utterance.
Quine instead gives the identical rivals response: The existence of alternative translation manuals shows not that we should suspend judgment on which is the 'correct' or 'true' translation, but rather that neither is the one true or correct translation. As Quine says:
The problem is not one of hidden facts. …The question whether If one is going to resist the Quinean deflation of meaning, it will not be by invoking the future discrimination condition. No one imagines that future linguists will be able to construct meaning-ometers that determine which translation manual gives the true meanings of the words. Rather, it must be that there is some theoretical advantage to positing meanings. Katz (1967; , for example, argues that such a theoretical advantage exists-that there is a systematic reason internal to linguistics or semantics for positing meanings.
This is a further illustration of the kind of consideration we have in mind with the heuristic utility condition: If there is no heuristic or theoretical advantage of one translation manual over the other, then there seems no ground left for resisting the identical rivals response.
Conclusion
We have argued for two general conclusions regarding the identical rivals response in actual scientific cases: First, it goes along with deflating the ontology of one or both theory formulations. The wouldbe rivals are made to agree because the points on which they could disagree are taken to be merely verbal differences. Second, the identical rivals response is never necessitated by the situation itself. It is, rather, a decision under uncertainty. It is a strategic choice about how to respond to apparent underdetermination.
In the previous section, we suggested two conditions which ought to influence this strategic choice. The future discriminability condition suggests that one should not apply the identical rivals response if there is evidence that future observations will allow you to detect effects of the posits about which the theories seem to disagree. 
